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        NOT PRECEDENTIAL   
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 15-2718 
___________ 
 
ROBERT HARRIOTT, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
CITY OF WILKES BARRE; WILKES BARRE POLICE DEPARTMENT;  
ROBERT COLLINS; SGT. SHERIDAN; BENSON; OFFICER CONMY;  
CODE ENFORCEMENT; FRANK KRATZ; MICHAEL SIMONSON 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 3-14-cv-01087) 
District Judge:  Honorable Richard P. Conaboy 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
January 4, 2016 
Before: FISHER, SHWARTZ and COWEN, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: January 5, 2016) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 Pro se appellant Robert Harriott appeals from the District Court’s orders 
dismissing his amended complaint and deeming moot an untitled document he had filed.  
For the reasons that follow, we will affirm. 
 On June 5, 2014, Harriott filed a complaint against the City of Wilkes-Barre, 
Pennsylvania (“the City”); the Wilkes-Barre Police Department; and various police 
officers and building inspectors seeking $52 million in damages.   In screening the 
complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), the Magistrate Judge discerned that 
Harriott alleged that his rights had been violated by the conduct of the Wilkes-Barre 
police in connection with the apparent arrest of third parties at a property owned by 
Harriott, and the subsequent conduct of building code inspectors who, after being 
summoned by the police, accused Harriott of violating building safety codes and 
operating an illegal boarding house.  The Magistrate Judge recommended dismissing the 
complaint without prejudice because it failed to comply with Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 8, improperly named the Wilkes-Barre Police Department as a defendant, and 
failed to state a claim against the City.  The District Court adopted the recommendation 
and provided Harriott 14 days to file an amended complaint.   
 Harriott filed a timely amended complaint.  On April 30, 2015, in screening 
Harriott’s amended complaint pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), the Magistrate Judge 
issued a second report recommending dismissal of the claims against the City, the 
Wilkes-Barre Police Department, and Officers Benson and Conmy with prejudice for 
failure to state a claim.  With respect to the remaining claims and defendants, the 
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Magistrate Judge recommended that the amended complaint be dismissed without 
prejudice for failure to comply with Rule 8, specifically highlighting the amended 
complaint’s failure to set forth any prayer for relief.  On June 1, 2015, after the time for 
filing objections to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation had passed, Harriott filed an 
untitled document reasserting allegations made in his amended complaint and once again 
including a request for $52 million.  
 In an order entered on June 8, 2015, the District Court adopted the Magistrate 
Judge’s second report and recommendation and dismissed the City, the Wilkes-Barre 
Police Department, and Officers Benson and Conmy with prejudice for failure to state a 
claim, and the remaining defendants without prejudice for failure to comply with Rule 8.  
The District Court’s order provided Harriott with one final opportunity to amend his 
complaint within 14 days and warned Harriott that failure to do so would result in 
dismissal of the matter with prejudice.  Also on June 8, 2015, the District Court entered a 
separate order informing Harriott that he was “on notice that his June 1, 2015, untitled 
filing . . . is deemed moot to the extent he may intend to request action of the Court,” and 
referring him to the accompanying order allowing him to file a second amended 
complaint within 14 days.  On June 29, 2015, after Harriott failed to file a subsequent 
amended complaint within that specified time period, the District Court entered an order 
dismissing the case with prejudice.  Harriott appeals.  We have jurisdiction over this 
appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.   
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 Although Harriott raised a number of claims in his complaint, he presented only 
three in his brief to this Court: (1) the District Court erred in rejecting his June 1, 2015, 
untitled filing in its June 8, 2015 order; (2) the City was improperly dismissed on June 8, 
2015; and (3) the Magistrate Judge was biased.  We shall address these three arguments 
and consider all others waived for failure to brief.  See Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 
182 (3d Cir. 1993); Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam).  
 Harriott first argues that his untitled filing should have been accepted by the 
District Court as a timely objection to the Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation.  
To the extent Harriott’s untitled filing was intended to be an objection to the Magistrate 
Judge’s report and recommendation, however, it was untimely.  His objections were due 
on or before May 18, 2015.  See ECF No. 9; see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).  He did not 
submit his untitled filing until June 1, 2015.1  Although on appeal Harriott claims that his 
receipt of the report and recommendation was delayed in the mail, he never informed the 
District Court of these circumstances, nor did he request leave to file objections out of 
time.2   
                                              
1 Harriott is not incarcerated, and is therefore not entitled to the mailbox rule for his 
filings.  See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276 (1988). 
 
2 Upon review, it appears that Harriott’s June 1, 2015 filing could also be construed as an 
attempt to file a second amended complaint in response to the Magistrate Judge’s report 
and recommendation.  To the extent that Harriott’s filing was such an attempt, we cannot 
say that the District Court erred in deeming it moot.  Harriott did not inform the District 
Court that he intended the untitled filing, docketed as a “Document/Letter,” to be his 
second amended complaint, as he had done with his first amended complaint.  Moreover, 
in declaring the document moot, the District Court did not foreclose Harriott from 
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 On appeal, Harriott also argues that the City, which he characterizes as “the main 
defendant,” was improperly dismissed.  We exercise plenary review over the District 
Court’s dismissal of the City for failure to state a claim under § 1915(e).  See Allah v. 
Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).  We agree with the District Court that 
Harriott failed to allege sufficient facts to state a claim against the City for the acts of its 
police officers and employees.  A municipality cannot be held liable in a § 1983 action on 
a theory of respondeat superior.  See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 
(1978).  Instead, liability may be imposed only where it can be shown that the 
municipality had a policy, regulation, custom, or practice that led to the alleged 
constitutional violation.  See Mulholland v. Gov’t County of Berks, 706 F.3d 227, 237 
(3d Cir. 2013).  Harriott’s amended complaint described only his personal experiences 
and contained no allegations whatsoever of a policy, custom, or practice of the City that 
resulted in the alleged harm.  Moreover, given that Harriott was previously provided with 
notice of how to fix his complaint and failed to correct the deficiency with respect to the 
City in his amended complaint, the District Court did not err when it declined to grant 
Harriott further leave to amend with respect to this defendant.  See Grayson, 293 F.3d at 
108 (explaining that leave to amend need not be granted if amendment would be futile). 
                                                                                                                                                  
amending his complaint a second time.  Indeed, the District Court expressly informed 
Harriott of his ability to file a second amended complaint in accordance with the 
instructions in the order of dismissal entered that same day.  See Grayson v. Mayview 
State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002) (explaining that a district court generally 
must allow a plaintiff leave to amend a deficient complaint prior to dismissal unless 
doing so would be futile). 
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 Finally, to the extent that Harriott argues that the Magistrate Judge was biased 
against him, we have carefully reviewed the record and detect nothing that raises an 
inference of bias.  See, e.g., Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994) 
(“[J]udicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality 
motion.”). 
 Accordingly, we will affirm District Court’s judgment. 
